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This artice analyzes the Second Circu.it decision of Panzirer 
v. Wolf  wh1ch held that  secondary rebance on  the integrity 
of the market could support a cause of action based on Rule 
JOb-5 of the Securities  Exchange  Act.    The  author also ex- 
amines prior cases relied upon by the Second Circuit and con- 
cludes by questioning whether the Panzirer  holding is justified. 
 
Relying on the Integrity of the Market 
Upon  reading  a favorable article  about  a company  in  the Wall 
Street Journal of September 29, 1978,  an investor  purchased  some 
?fits stock.   Whethe company  initiated  bankruptcy proceedings 
m 1979,  sh ued tts officers and  accountants under Section  lO(b) 
of the Secuntles Exchange Act, 1  alleging that  the company's  annual 
report,  issued in August  1978,  was fraudulent.  Although  she had 
never seen  the annual  report,  her compl aint  asserted  "that  the an- 
nual report  affected the market,  and therefore  she had relied on the 
report  through  her  reliance  on  the integrity  of the market." 2 
The plaintiff also sought to represent  the class of investors pur- 
chasing  the company's  stock after release of its annual  report.  The 
district   judge  denied   class  certification   on  the  grounds that  the 
weakness  of her case  concerning reliance  on  the  report  made her 
claim  atypical  and  that  her  lack  of credibility   made  her  an inad- 
equate  class representative.  Affirming  the denial  of cl ass certifica- 
tion  on  the  basis  that  the  numerous  changes  in  the  plaintiff's tes- 
timony supported the trial  judge's  ruling on credibility,  the Second 
Circuit  did  not  decide  "whether  [plaintiff's]  weak  showing of reli- 
ance makes her claim atypical  under  Fed. R. Civ. P.23 (a) (3)." 3 
 
• Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1  15 u.s.c. § 78j(b) (1976).
 
2 Panzirerv. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981). 
3 Id. at 368 n.4. 
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In  dismissing  the  plaintiff's  individual   suit  on  summary   judg- 
ment, the district  judge held that  primary reliance  h ad  been on  the 
newspaper article,  and  that  secondary  reliance  on  the  integrity  of 
the market was insufficient to support  a Rule 1Ob-5 claim.  The Sec- 
ond Circuit  reversed,  noting  that  "Defendants have  introduced no 
evidence to contradict [the]  chain  of causation  [implicit  in  plain- 
tiff's complaint  between  the  fraudulent report  and  her  share  pur- 
chase]," 4     and  holding  that  "though, at  trial,  the  validity  of  the 
chain of causation  will be tested,  on summary  judgment  questions 
about this chain of causation  must  be resolved in favor  of plaintiff , 
who in the case  of  a material  fraud  on  the  market  enjoys  a  pre- 
sumption of reliance." 5 
 
 




This holding  not  only  rejects  a  doctrinal  distinction  between 
primary and  secondary  reliance,   but  also  establishes a  cause  of 
action, in  that  the  plaintiff's  allegations  of  "a  material   fraud  on 
the market" are held  sufficient to  resist a motion  to dismiss  in the 
absence of evidence  from  either  party.   The  Second  Circuit  seeks 
support for  this  ruling  by  reference  to  its 1976 decision  in Com- 
petitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol,  Krekstein, Horwath &  Hor- 
wath,'  which  involved  an  investment   manager's  mishandling of 
an investment  fund,   and   the  concealment  of  his  previous   mis- 
handling of  another  fund  by  allegedly  false  financial  statements 
certified by  the  defendant accountants.   In  that  case,  the district 
court had granted  summary  judgment on the ground  that  the plain- 
tiff  could not  prove  reliance  on  the  financial  statements,  and  the 
Second Circuit  reversed,  holding  that  the plaintiff  "need  not  prove 
direct reliance,  but only causation in fact."  7 
 
 
4 /d. at 367. 
aId. 
'516 F.2d 811 (2d  Cir. 1976). 
7 Panzirer v. Wolf, note 2 supra, at 368. 
• 9 
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Distinguishing Competitive Associates 
 
 




That  Competitive Associates is distinguishable is clear.  The PUr- 
pose  of  the  accountant's certification   is  to  designate information 
contained in  certified  statements as  having  been  processed  in ac. 
cordance  with  professional  standards.  Such  statements are  there.. 
fore  relied  upon  as setting  limits  to the impact  of manipulative  fi. 
nancial  devices resorted  to by corporate insiders.   Annual  reports 
on  the  other  hand,  since  they  carry  no  such  professional  impri: 
matur,8   cannot  with  equal  justification  be treated  as  causing the 
fraud  about  which  they  might  have  given  warning.    The  relevant 
question   thus  becomes  why  the  Competitive   Associates  holding 
governed  the  decision  in  Panzirer v. Wolf. 
 
 
The Second  Circuit's Rationale 
 
The  rationale of  the  Second  Circuit  in  Panzirer v. Wolf is as 
follows: 
 
Proving  reliance  is necessarily  difficult where  the  fraud  bas af. 
fected  the  market   and  damaged   the  plaintiff  only  through its 
effect on  the market  [but]  this and  other  circuits  do not require 
direct reliance  where the fraud  affects the market,  on the ground 
that an investor  relies generally  on the supposition that the mar- 
 
 
a Since  annual  reports  include  financial  statements,  they  do,  of  course, 
contain  such  certifications,  and  on  this  basis, the decision  in Competitiv 
Associates could have been treated  as determinative.   Indeed,  the first foot- 
note in Panzirer indicates  that  the  accountants  were sufficiently concerned 
at one point  to include  in  their  certification a  qualification  as to  the com- 
pany's  ability  to  function  as  a  going  concern,  something   which st on y 
suggests  a  failure  to  disclose  material  information.   The  Second  Circuit, 
however, cites Competitive   Associates  for  the  proposition  that  reliance is 
established when causation  in fact is shown.  This doctrinal substitution (of 
proof  of  causation  in fact  for  reliance)   is based on  the Supreme Cou 'a 
decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens  v. United  States, a case analyzed later m 
this article. 
It  is in terms  of  proof  of  causation  in  fact  functioning  as  an  effective 
substitute for  proof  of reliance  that  the financial statements  in Competitiv 
Associates can  be distinguished  (as  being  more  directly  implicated in the 
fraud)   from  those  at  issue  in  Panzirer.   Such  a  distinction  parallel.s the 
district  judge's  holding  which  was based on  the con trast  between prunary 
and secondary  reliance. 
ket price is  validly  set  and  that  no  unsuspected   fraud  has  af- 
fected the pnce. 
 
llu•  Chip  Stamps  v. Manor  Drug  Stores 
 
To ask whether  this rationale correctly  states  the  law  of  Rule 
lOb-S is to ask whether it is consistent  with the U.S. Supree Court 
inion in  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor  Drug Stores10     wh1ch held 
:at he Second Circuit  case of Birnbaum v. Newport SteeC r .    11 
"was rightly decided,  and  that it bars respondent from  mamta g 
this suit  under  Rule   lOb-5." 12     Blue Chip  was  handed   down  m 
1975, and  litigation  during  the intervening yea.rhas  left   ncle r 
the precise connection between  the  two propos1t10ns contamed m 
the holding.  Nor is this lack  of clarity surprising.   In eed,  doc- 
trinal distinction  between  primary  and  secondary reliance  reJect.ed 
by the Second Circuit in Panzirer v. Wolf is itself a model of c an 
when compared  with  the  distinction  drawn   by the Sec?nd  .C1rcmt 
in Birnbaum between  corporate  mismanagement, which  ts. go:- 
erned solely by state  law, and fraud  affecting  the market, which  ts 
subject to federal  securities  legislation.   Yet it ws  preci.sely on the 
basis of  the  latter   distinction  that  Birnbaum  differentiated  those 
stock transactions   that  were  covered   by  Rule   lOb-S  from   those 
that were not. 
 
SEC v. Texas Gulf  Sulphur  Co. 
 
In 1968, SEC  v. Texas Gulf Sulphur  Co. 13    presented  the Sec- 
ond Circuit with an opportunity to define  the circumstances under 
which stock purchases  by corporate insiders  created  liability  under 
Rule lOb-5.  The  district  court  had  found  that  the  information on 
the basis of which  the stock  had  been  purchased  was not  material, 
a  finding based  on  the  uncontradicted  testimony   of  expert   wit- 
nesses. The appellate court  reversed,  however,  holding  that  the 
materiality of  the  information  at  issue  was  not  a  matter   to  be 
 
 
'Panzirer v. Wolf, note 2 supra, at 368. 
10 421 u.s. 723  (1975).
 
11 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.),  cert. denied 343 U.S. 956  (1952). 
12 Blue Chip Stamps  v. Manor  Drug Stores, note 10 supra, at 730. 
13 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1005  (1971). 
-.
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determined   by what  the parties  thought  or  reasonably could h 
thought•. bu.t that."insider trading  activity  constitutes .. . the 
 
ave 
vood  v. Walker  is not  in the  usual  case  determinative,  be- 
Sher;o use the language of  that  decision,  the "substance of  the 
truly obJective evidence  of ... materiality." 14 0nly  ca.use, bargained  for"  will  in  almost  all  cases   ither be  the. price 
As  in  Texas Gulf  Sulphur, the  decision  in  Panzirer  v.  JiV  lf  . 
sought  to be justified by an appeal  to the nature  of market  acti .  11 
for can  justifiably  be argued  to  be somethig reflect  d 10  the 
to which  the  parties  agreed.    Sherwood, m  short,  ts  a  case 
pnce Vtty;
 
Zelda  Panzirer did not  rely on  the integrity  of the market  . 
ts cite rather   than  apply,  not  because  breedm'
 
g cows  are  m. -
 




not  rely  on .
 
pnce ,  but  she  did  rely  on  th Pnce 
c:our ble of  being  distinguished   from   cattle   raised   for   beef,  but 
c:apa  se the Sherwood  rationale explicitly  postulates the  possibility 
· f  h  . . e tn. 
tegnty  o   t e  market  m  producmg  the  information reported i 
the Wall Street  Journal.  Just  as a material  misinterpretatio 0 
 









.   . . nor 
omtsston IS presumed  to affect the price of the stock, so it should 
be yresumed  to  affec.t the  information  "heard   on  the  street" 
whtch led  Zelda  Panz1rer to make  her losing investment. u 
.  nfortu ately, thimage  of  the  market  as  providing  all  par. 
lctpants wtth equal  tnform tion•. whatever  is merits  as an analyt- 
ICal model,  represents   a  dtstortton   of  realtty.    The  view  of  the 
market shared  by Panzirer and Texas Gulf Sulphur is an ideal, and 
cond ct  failing  to  comply  with  that  ideal  is  treated   as  justifying 
legal mterference with  economic  activity.   Whether  decisions em. 
bodying  that  view are  consistent with  Blue  Chip  remains  unclear 
because  Supreme   Court  decisions  interpreting  Blue  Chip  remain 
ambiguous  about  the extent  to which  it adopted  a doctrine incon- 
sistent  with  the  Texas Gulf  Sulphur  view of the  market  as some- 
thing more  than  a mechanism  for  the setting of prices. 
Sherwood  v. Walker 
Perhaps  the clearest  example of the deep  common-law  roots of 
such   a  view  is  provided   by  Sherwood   v.  Walker  (Rose   IT of 
Abalone), 16    the  case  which  held  that  a  mutual   mistake  of fact 
about  the  "substance of  the  thing  bargained  for"  justifies the ju- 
diciary  in  voiding  a contract.  Sherwood  v. Walker, however, also 
serves as an example  of the effective limits  to legal doctrine, since 
almost  none of the decisions in which it is cited are  resolved on the 
basis of a finding of mutual  mistake  of fact. 
14Jd. at 851. 
15 Panzirer v. Wolf, note 2 supra, at 368. 
1 6 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887). 
'tb the mechantsm  of a functwnmg market.   The  questwn  ratsed, 
:erefore, is  why  inconsistency  with  the  functioning  of  a  price- 
tting mechanism should  render  a precedent,  "revered by teachers 
:contract law," 18    ineffective in terms of being applied  as well as 
cited. 
 
committing Society  to  the  Value  of  Change 
To make  possible   restrictions   on  individual   behavior,  society 
must agree to at  least  the  possibility  of coercing  the losing  party. 
Societies permit  such  coercion   to  prevent   behavior  perceived   as 
threatening to the existing social organization.  Every  market, how- 
ever, insofar as it operates to produce new categories  of consumers 
and products, is in fact  changing  the existing  economic  and  social 
structure. Thus,  the scope and  pace of this country's industrializa- 
tion in the last  half of the  nineteenth  century  inevitably   produced 
legal attempts by existing communities to restrict economic activity. 
The Supreme  Court's designation of those attempts as unconsti- 
tutional committed  our  society  to  the value  of  change,  to  a pref- 
erence for  the  future   possibility  rather   than   the  preservation  of 
what is.  This commitment, contained  in decisions  interpreting the 
commerce clause,  transformed a set of diverse  political  and  social 
communities into   a  single economic   unit;   those  decisions   were 
accepted on  the  basis  that  they  were  compelled   by law,  that  our 
Consti tution voided  not the act of a particular community attempt- 
ing to regulate  the workings of the marketplace, but any  A or B to 
whom the facts of the decision  applied. 
 
17Jd. at 576,  33 N.W. at 923. 
1a H. Kook & Co. v. Scheinmann  Hochstein & Trotta,  Inc.,  414 F.2d  83, 
98 (2d Cir. 1969). 
t
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Molding Precedents to  Get  a  Desired  Result
 " 21    the  Second   Circuit  carefully   noted   that   its  test 
dosed fac 
. [ , ]  the  individual .  . plamtif bl reasona " 22 man. 
As lawyers know,  however, the foregoing  significantly  overst -..·.bstitut e ds  alt hough  it may  be true  that  the  repeated descn·p- 





ndamental  purpose'   of  the
 
. . 
s  Exc h ]
 
opinion,  either   by  stressing   more  strongly   an  element   thatc:a
 ,.. f 
 
tct 
'th 'fu [Secuntte ange 
by  a  court   that  wishes  not   to  overrule   a  potentially  con.fli ·ed U·Ooo ementing a 'philisophy o.f  full. 
. ' 32 It dtsclosure . s.ta es
 
considered only  in  passing  in  the  earlier  opinion   or  by expandi as 
thuniverse of the factors considered in arriving  at the result.  : 
pnce   e acted by  a  law  opn to  subterranean  change  is residual 
1 market in which the Identity of any gtven  mdtvtdual 
111·mpersona t is equally  true that the question  of the status  of that 
. 'd nin  connection with  the  parttcular transaction emg  re- indiVI  ua 'd . .  d t .  . 
.  ed has been regarded as a relevant  const  eratton m   e ermm- 
uncertamty about   the  applicable standard,  an  uncertainty   whose Y
.
JeWliability  under hat  Act.24 
value inheres in the f act  that  the law is ultimately  a control  device 
an attempt to influence behavior  that has not yet occurred. Indeed' 
the  clearer  and  more  uniform  a  rule  is,  the  more  easily  it is 
garded  aa  for aliy that  .cn  justifiaby  bma ipulated so long 
as compliance with  Its explicit  formulation IS mamtained.  As our 
ID& h   Second  Circuit's opinion  in  List  demonst rates,  courts  are 
Absl teof deciding  cases  in  accordance w1·th  potenti'a11y  con:flcit- 
: ta:dards. Thus,  what  List  held  was th at, ?epe ding upon  the 
ts of the case,  reliance  is an  issue to be decided  m  terms  of  the 
:dividual plaintiff rather  than  the legal  cnst ruct of the reasonable 
experience with  the  tax  code  has  demonstrated,  any  sufficiently  
man.
 Accountants  in   cer tifying   financial   statements   (such f as
 
uniform  formula will at  some  point  be exploited by the  develop- those involved  in  Competitive  Associates)  rnake st·ml·1ar  pro es- 
ment of an application not  derivable from  the regularities in terms ·udgmen 
1 
ts  about   choices   among   generally    accepted  ac- 
of which the formula was developed. Entrepreneurs, in these terms, 11008 g principles, when more than  one s h . . 1  . bly 
a gua 
countin ue   prmc1p.e s 
can  be  defined  as  individuals who  develop  such  variations   (and 
app1.   ble to  the  transaction  being  recorded.  The  distmctton  be-
 
thus  change the  definition of  the  operational market),  and  U.S.
 1ca 




tween pn  . . I tnc   · d 
law  can  be  defined  as  a  set  of formulae that  attempts to govern 
entrepreneurial activity  without  distinguishing r ules  applicable  to 
entrepreneurs from  those that  govern  the activities  of others. 
 
Status  of  the  Individual 
 
This  uniform   treatment inevitably   creates   difficulties  when the 
person  whose  beh avior is being considered is, in vocational terms, 
an  "insider," a  "market  professional."  In  terms  of  Rule  lOb-5, 
List  v. Fashion  Park , lnc. 19    is instructive, since  the  Second  Cir- 
cuit's  basis for  refusing  recovery  in that  case appears to have been 
the plaintiff's status  as "an  ex perienced  and  successful  investor." 20 
Thus, after  holding  "[t]he  proper  test .. . [concerning the meaning 
of  'reliance' in  a  case  of  nondisclosure under  Rule   lOb-5  to be] 
whether  the  plaintiff  would  have  been influenced  to  act  differently 
than  he did  act  if the  defendant had  disclosed   to  him  the  undis- 
 
19 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). 
in Panzirer v. Wolf  represents  an  attempt  to  facilitate such  JU   g- 
ments, to prevent  a situation in which  market  losses  a ·e automat- 
ically converted  into  a cause  of action  at law  by tSIIDle state- 
ment that the purchase was made in reliance  on the   mtegnty of the 
market." 
 
Doctrinal Distinctions and  Pleadings 
As is usually  the  case  with  doctrinal distinctions,  the  question 
reduces to one  of  pleading.    Thus,  bad  the  claim  been  made  that 
 
21 ld. at 463. 
22fd. 
23 Santa Fe Indus.,  Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477  (1977) · . 
24See,  e.g., Dupuy  v.  Dupuy,  551  F.2d  1005   (5th  Cr..1977),  w 1cb 
alated that "the  diligence  of  the  plaintiff  in  lOb-5  cases Judged. su bjec- 
tively," id. at 1016,  and cited as an example "a  jur y instructiOn that 1mposed 
a duty of diligence  'solely  under  the ecul ar  circumsnceof  e ch  case, 
including existence of  a fiduciary  relat10n b1p . . . po1t1on m the  mdustry, 
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there  was direct reliance on  the market  price,  a case  of "fraud 
the market" would  have  been alleged.   The  precise  q uestion r · 00 





ns cannot   be  reconc.iled  w.tth  th e 1egt.s1at1.ve  attempt  to  use 
. .  d . . by the Seco.nd Ctrcmt e tstn, there ore
 
. atsed 
IS  whether  the fact that
 
CI(I Ze
·gors  of  the  marketplace · 
the n . 
order   to  end   the  status  of  de- 
.
 
no such claun  was made J USttfies applicatiOn  of a doctrinal dist· 







hich claims of reliance  on the "integrit y of the mar  : 
dency imposed  on  reservation  Indtans. 
pe he fact  that  Affiliated  Ute  Citizes  can  be seen  to  have  been 
correctly decided•  however,  means  netther  th at the precedent Wol f
 
 
are msu   ctent  to state  a cause  of action. et finds in  th at 
 









that other  courts  asked  to apply  Section   lO (b) should  hfollodt?e 
Secon
d Circuit  in  finding  "no su pport   in  the  law  for  t  e 1stnct 
rt's distinction  between  primary  and secondary re1. nce." 2s  Ad - 
 
The  basis  for  the  Second  Circuit's  ref usal  to  require  that  "in- 
tegrity  of  the  market" causes  of  action  include  allegations of re- 
liance  on  the  market price  itself  was the Supreme Cou rt decisio 
in  Affiliated  U te Citizens v. United States,25    whose  application  t 
Panzirer  the Second  Circuit  described  as follows: 
 
Where,   as  is  here  alleged,   the fraud   consists   of  a  failure  to 
disclose,  the difficult  nature of  plaintiff 's  claim-that  if there 
had  been disclosu re, plaintiff  would  not have  been  harmed-has 
led  the Supreme  Court  to  hold  that  if the  omissi on  is material 
reliance  upon  the omission  will be presumed.26 ' 
 
What  Affiliated   Ute  Citizens  holds,  according to  its  author,  is 
that "bank agents dealing in the stock of a Ute Indian development 
corporation had  a duty  to reveal  to mixed-blood Indian customers 
that  their shares could  bring a higher  price on a non-Indian market 
of  which  the  sellers   were  unaware." 27     The  corporation in  ques- 
tion  had  been  created  by the  federal  government to  hold  Indian 
assets as part of a program aimed  at endi ng the system  of reserva- 
tions  by acquainting Indians  with  a  market  economy.  Given  that 
context,  it  may  have  been  appropriate to  assume  that  Indian  and 
non-Indian  markets   existed,   that  they  were  identifiably   separate 
and  distinct entities, and  that  mixed-blood Indians  failed   to un- 
derstand that  purchases of  commercial property  are  produced  by 
the  belief  that  buyers  willing  to  pay  higher  prices  can  be found. 
 
25 406 u.s. 128  (1972). 
26  Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d  365, 368 (2d Cir. 1981). 
27 Chiarella  v. United  States,  445 U.S. 222, 250-251 (1980)   (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
cou . f 1 1 
·uedly,  particular  distinctions detract   from   the  clanty o  ega
 
:ctrine; the clarity  of  the concept  of a market provi ing  all par- 
ticipants with equal information has the appeal  of makmg  unneces- 
sary decisions   ( e.g.,  List )   which  are   pplicble only  to  the  par- 
ticular plaintiff.   Neither  of  these  considerat10ns,  however,  seems 













The Coca-Cola Compa ny buys a little over 10  percent  of all sugar in the 
United States. 
Parker  Brothers  prints  about  the  sa me  amou nt  of  money  an nually  for
 
Monopoly sets as the U.S. Treasury  prints for  us. 
On a ratio of cost of  goods  to selling price,  pizza  is  the  most  profitable 
fast-food item. 
-"The Money  Lists" 
Jeffrey  Feinman 
